In this work, we describe a simple and efficient construction of a large subset S of F p , where p is a prime, such that the set A(S) for any non-identity affine map A over F p has small intersection with S .
Introduction
Non-malleable Codes (NMCs). NMCs were introduced in [DPW10] as a beautiful relaxation of error-correction and error-detection codes. Informally, given a tampering family F , an NMC (Enc, Dec) against F encodes a given message m into a codeword c ← Enc(m) in a way that, if the adversary modifies m to c = f (c) for some f ∈ F , then the message m = Dec(c ) is either the original message m, or a completely "unrelated value". As has been shown by the recent progress [DPW10, LL12, DKO13, ADL14, FMVW13, FMNV14, CG14a, CG14b] NMCs aim to handle a much larger class of tampering functions F than traditional error-correcting or errordetecting codes, at the expense of potentially allowing the attacker to replace a given message x by an unrelated message x . NMCs are useful in situations where changing x to an unrelated x is not useful for the attacker (for example, when x is the secret key for a signature scheme.)
Split-State Model. NMCs do not exist for the class of all functions F all . In particular, it does not include functions of the form f (c) := Enc(h(Dec(c))), since Dec(f (Enc(m))) = h(m) is clearly related to m. One of the largest and practically relevant tampering families for which we can construct NMCs is the so-called split-state tampering family where the codeword is split into two parts c 1 c 2 , and the adversary is only allowed to tamper with c 1 , c 2 independently to get f 1 (c 1 ) f 2 (c 2 ). A lot of the aforementioned results [LL12, DKO13, ADL14, CG14b, FMNV14] have studied NMCs against split-state tampering. [ADL14] gave the first (and the only one so far) information-theoretically secure construction in the split-state model from n-bit messages to n 7 log 7 n-bit codewords (i.e., code rate n 6 log 7 n). The security proof of this scheme relied on an amazing property of the inner-product function modulo a prime, that was proved using results from additive combinatorics.
Affine-evasive Sets and Our Result. One of the crucial steps in the construction of [ADL14] was the construction of NMC against affine tampering modulo p. This was achieved by constructing an affine-evasive set of size p 1/ log log p modulo a prime p. It was asked as an open question whether there exists an affine-evasive set of size p Θ(1) , which will imply constant rate NMC against affine-tampering and rate n 6 NMC against split-state tampering. 1 We resolve this question in the affirmative by giving an affine-evasive set of size Θ(
Explicit Construction
For any set S ⊂ Z Z , let aS + b = {as + b|s ∈ S}. By S mod p ⊆ F p , we denote the set of values of S modulo p.
We first define an affine-evasive set S ⊆ F p .
Definition 1 A non-empty set S ⊆ F p is said to be (γ, ν)-affine-evasive if |S| ≤ γp, and for any (a, b) ∈ F 2 p \ {(1, 0)}, we have
Now we give a construction of an affine-evasive set.
Let Q := {q 1 , . . . , q t } be the set of all primes less than 1 2 p 1/4 . Define S ⊂ F p as follows:
Thus, S has size Θ(
log p ) by the prime number theorem.
Theorem 1 For any prime p, the set S defined in Equation ( 1) is (
Proof. Clearly,
where β i , α i ∈ Q for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and α i = α j for any i = j .
For any i, if β i = α i , then b · β i = 1 − a mod p, which has at most one solution (since we assume (a, b) = (1, 0)). Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that β i = α i , for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and β 1 < β 2 < β 3 .
From Equation (2), we have that
which on simplification implies
Note that both the left-hand and right-hand side of the above equation takes values between −p 16 and p 16 , and hence the equality holds in Z Z (and not just in Z Z p ).
(
By equation 3, we have that β 3 divides (α 2 − α 1 )(β 3 − β 1 )β 2 α 3 . Clearly, β 3 is relatively prime to α 3 , β 2 , and β 3 − β 1 . Therefore, β 3 divides (α 2 − α 1 ). This implies
Also, from equation 3, we have that α 2 divides (α 2 − α 1 )(β 3 − β 1 )β 2 α 3 , which by similar reasoning implies α 2 divides β 3 − β 1 . Thus, using that β 3 > β 1 ,
Similarly, we can obtain α 1 divides β 3 − β 2 , which implies
Equation (5) and (6) together imply that |α 2 − α 1 | < β 3 , which contradicts Equation (4).
Affine-evasive function and Efficient NMCs
Affine-evasive function. We recall here the definition of affine-evasive functions from [ADL14] . Affine-evasive functions immediately give efficient construction of NMCs against affine-tampering.
Definition 2 A surjective function h : F p → M ∪ {⊥} is called (γ, δ)-affine-evasive if for any a, b ∈ F p such that a = 0, and (a, b) = (1, 0), and for any m ∈ M,
A uniformly random X such that h(X) = m is efficiently samplable.
We now mention a result that shows that we can construct an affine-evasive function from an affine-evasive set S .
Lemma 1 ([ADL14, Claim 5])
Let S ⊆ F p be a (γ, ν)-affine-evasive set with ν · K ≤ 1, and K divides |S|. 2 Furthermore, let S be ordered such that for any i, the i-th element is efficiently computable in O(log p). Then there exists a (γ, ν · K)-affine-evasive function h :
Note that the above result requires that for any i, the i-th element of S is efficiently computable for some ordering of the set S . This is not possible for our construction since for our construction this would mean efficiently sampling the i-th largest prime. However, this requirement was made just to make sure that h −1 is efficiently samplable. We circumvent this problem by giving a slightly modified definition of the affine-evasive function h in the proof of Lemma 2. Before proving this, we state the following result that we will need.
Theorem 2 ([HB88])
For any n ∈ N, and any n ≤ n such that n 12/7 ≥ n,
where π(n) denote the number of primes less than n.
Lemma 2 Let M be a finite set such that |M| ≥ 2, and let p ≥ |M| 16 be a prime. There exists an efficiently computable (p −3/4 , O(|M| log p · p −1/4 ))-affine-evasive function h :
Proof. Without loss of generality, let M = {1, . . . , K}, for some integer K . Let S ⊆ F p be as defined in Section 2. Define S 1 , . . . , S K to be a partition of S as follows.
Now let n i = 2K . By the construction of S , |S i | = π(n i ) − π(n i − n ). We will bound |S i | for all i ∈ [K] using Theorem 2. To do this, we need to verify that for all i, n 12/7 ≥ n i . Since n i < n j for all i < j , it is sufficient to show this for i = K , i.e., n i =
where we used the fact that p ≥ K 16 , and K ≥ 2. Also note that n i is upper bounded by p 1/4 2 , and hence log n i = O(log p). Thus, using Theorem 2, we get that each S i has size at least Θ(
K log p ). Let h : F p → M ∪ {⊥} be defined as follows:
The statement Pr(h(aU + b) = ⊥) ≤ p −3/4 is obvious by the definition of S , and the observation that aU + b is uniform in F p .
Also, for any m ∈ M, and for any (a, b) = (1, 0), and a = 0,
Also, sampling a uniformly random X such that h(X) = m is equivalent to sampling a uniformly random prime q in the interval
and computing 1/q mod p. Sampling q can be done in time polynomial in log p by repeatedly sampling a random element in I until we get a prime. Computing 1/q mod p can be done efficiently using Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
Note that the proof of Lemma 2 is identical to the proof of Lemma 1, except the proof that a uniformly random X such that h(X) = m is efficiently samplable for any given m.
Efficient NMCs. We recall here the definition of non-malleable codes for completeness.
Definition 3 Let F be some family of tampering functions. For each f ∈ F , and m ∈ M, define the tampering-experiment
which is a random variable over the randomness of the encoding function Enc. We say that a coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is ε-non-malleable w.r.t. is at most ε. Additionally, D f should be efficiently samplable given oracle access to f (·).
Using Lemma 2 and the construction of [ADL14] , we get the following results.
Theorem 3 There exists an efficient coding scheme (Enc, Dec) encoding k -bit messages to Θ(k + log( 1 ε )) bit codewords that is ε-non malleable w.r.t. the family of affine tampering functions F aff .
Theorem 4 There exists an efficient coding scheme (Enc, Dec) encoding k -bit messages to Θ((k + log( 1 ε )) 7 ) bit codewords that is ε-non malleable w.r.t. the family of split-state tampering functions F split .
Also, assuming the following conjecture from [ADL14] , our result gives the first NMC with constant rate in the split-state model. Theorem 5 Assuming Conjecture 1, there exists an efficient coding scheme (Enc, Dec) encoding k -bit messages to Θ(k + log( 1 ε )) that is ε-non malleable w.r.t. the family of split-state tampering functions F split .
